Why the promise standing behind a freezing order is the least examined part of it
The order of 28 August
On 28 August 2026 the Commercial Court gave an FCA-regulated introducing broker permission to enforce a cross-undertaking in damages and ordered an inquiry into the losses caused by a freezing injunction that had been wrongly obtained.[i]
The facts are ordinary enough to be useful. Apollo XI Limited, a British Virgin Islands company wholly owned by a Cayman exempted limited partnership, advanced US$10m to Nexedge Markets Limited under a ten-year unsecured loan agreement dated 21 August 2024.[ii] Nexedge is an introducing broker in contracts for difference, authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority since January 2004. Part of the purpose of the loan was to support an application to vary Nexedge’s permissions, submitted to the FCA on 24 December 2024, which would have allowed it to hold client money and to offer professional clients direct trading and liquidity. Its business plan projected profits after tax rising from £74,800 in the 2024/2025 tax year to £2.63m in 2027/2028.[iii]
The commercial relationship collapsed in April 2025. On 16 April Apollo applied without notice for a freezing injunction, relying on a recording of calls made in Nexedge’s office without the knowledge of the person recorded. Cheema-Grubb J granted the injunction, accepted the cross-undertaking and made the order for no more than 14 days, with a return date fixed for 24 April.[iv] Saini J discharged the order on 17 June 2025, holding that Cheema-Grubb J had been misled.[v] He found an overwhelming case for discharge arising from serious failures of full and frank disclosure, that there was no good arguable case, that there was no risk of dissipation and that continuation would not be just or fair. Of the circumstances in which the recording had been obtained he said that the court’s conscience was shocked.
Nexedge notified the FCA of the injunction on 12 May 2025. The regulator replied that it could not progress the variation application until it had considered the impact of the injunction and the associated litigation, and in an email of 14 October 2025 wrote that it had not been able to mitigate the risk that the firm’s capital position could be undermined by a negative judgment in the outstanding case. Nexedge withdrew the application in November 2025 following a call with the FCA on 10 November, and on 12 November notified the regulator under SUP 15 that it had breached its own funds requirement, recording that the erosion of its capital base arose from the unmeritorious injunction and the follow-on claim.[vi]
Mr Nigel Cooper KC has now permitted enforcement of the cross-undertaking and directed an inquiry into four heads of loss. They are disruption and delay to the variation application, reputational damage, business disruption including the drain on managerial time and the ultimate failure of the application.[vii]
The figure of £5m that has been reported needs care. The judgment records that the losses are not properly quantified at present and that Mr Ravi Nayer, the partner with conduct of the case for Nexedge, gives evidence that his client believes its loss exceeds £5m by reference to its projected profits had the variation been granted.[viii] That is a stated belief supported by a statement of truth. It is not a pleaded number and it should not be reported as the value of a claim.
A liability question largely answered
The English court takes a two-stage approach to a cross-undertaking. The first stage asks whether the court should, as a matter of discretion, order that the undertaking be enforced. The second asks what loss the defendant suffered, whether the order caused it and whether it was too remote.[ix] Only the first stage was before Cooper KC.
At that stage there is a strong rebuttable presumption in favour of enforcement. Neuberger LJ put it in terms that the defendant can normally expect, virtually as of right, to have an enquiry as to the damages to which he is entitled under the cross-undertaking.[x] Permission is therefore given unless there are special circumstances, which include inequitable behaviour by the defendant, a material change of circumstances since the without notice hearing and satisfaction that no damages have been suffered. The burden of persuasion sits on the party that obtained the injunction. The rationale of the third category is narrow, being that the court will not order a pointless inquiry into what is patently trivial loss.
Apollo confined itself to that third category and abandoned any case that the application was an abuse of process. It invited the court to conduct a detailed forensic analysis of the correspondence between Nexedge and the FCA and to find that no loss had been caused. Cooper KC declined. The authorities establish that where a freezing injunction is discharged an inquiry should follow almost as of right, that there should be no protracted investigation at the permission stage and that the question is only whether the defendant has a credible case that the injunction has caused it loss.[xi] The judge accepted an analogy with the summary judgment threshold, so that Nexedge had to show a realistic prospect of establishing causation of loss in the sense of more than merely arguable. He also declined to assume that Nexedge had already put forward its best evidence, since directions on an inquiry would ordinarily provide for pleadings, disclosure and further evidence.
Set against the ordinary commercial claim, the shape of this one is unusual. Wrongfulness has already been established by a judge on a contested application. The discharge findings are a matter of record. The presumption runs in the injured party’s favour and the burden of displacing it sits on the other side. What remains in issue is causation and quantum, together with the question the judgment of 28 August never reaches, which is whether the money exists.
The heads of loss are not the constraint
There is no conceptual limit to the heads of loss recoverable on an inquiry. They can include a loss of chance, unless the chance lost is so speculative that it must be disregarded. They can include damages at large covering upset, stress, loss of reputation, general loss of business opportunities and general business disruption. They can include lost management time.[xii] Cooper KC recorded that none of the heads advanced by Nexedge was of a type that could be considered unexpected.
Three of the four turn on the value of an FCA permission that was never granted, and that is territory which is not well mapped. A freezing order against a regulated firm operates differently from one against a trading company. Disclosure to the regulator is unavoidable, and the regulator then forms its own view of the firm’s standing and its capital. In this case the FCA said in terms that it could not progress the application while the injunction and the litigation were unresolved, and Nexedge ended up reporting a breach of its own funds requirement. Saini J had anticipated the point at the return date, observing that there was substantial force in the submission that the injunction, if continued, would cripple Nexedge at a critical moment in its growth phase.[xiii]
The upper end of this exposure is well established. In the Fiona Trust litigation the assessment under the cross-undertaking produced US$59.8m in damages together with US$11.04m in interest before Males J, upheld on appeal notwithstanding damning findings about the honesty and credibility of the party recovering. In the Alta Trading inquiry now before the Commercial Court the two principal defendants claim losses of the order of US$500m for a trading business they say they would have established, alternatively US$113m for lost employment.[xiv]
Causation, and the argument that runs both ways
Two propositions are uncontroversial. The injunction must be an effective cause of the loss, though it need not be the sole or exclusive cause. Loss is recoverable where there are concurrent causes, one being the injunction and one being the substantive litigation.[xv]
The third proposition is the live one. In the Alta Trading inquiry Henshaw J held it well arguable that the own wrong principle is a policy of general application, and well arguable that an evaluative judgment on causation would result in a party which had made dishonest allegations in proceedings in which it obtained a freezing order being held liable for damage caused by that order even where some or all of the damage would also have resulted from the allegations themselves.[xvi] The point is not settled, and the article should not pretend otherwise.
Cooper KC held that Nexedge had at least realistic prospects of relying on that principle, so that Apollo could not treat its own abandoned original claim as the cause of the loss, and that in any event the injunction and that claim were at least realistically arguable as concurrent proximate causes. He was careful to record that there has been no judicial finding that Apollo made the original claim dishonestly or maliciously. He also found a credibly arguable case that Apollo commenced the original claim and sought the injunction intending to cause Nexedge loss, resting in part on an email of 3 June 2025 inviting the firm’s staff, clients and partners to attend the return date and offering to pay their travel and accommodation.[xvii]
For anyone pricing this class of claim, that combination is the point. An applicant who obtained an injunction improperly faces a serious obstacle in pointing to its own improper substantive claim as the true cause of the damage.
The covenant nobody valued
The judgment of 28 August says nothing about whether Apollo can pay. There is no reference in it to fortification, to security, to insurance, to funding or to Apollo’s financial standing. That silence is unremarkable, because the application before Cooper KC was Nexedge’s application to enforce rather than a challenge to the grant, and Apollo’s means were not in issue.
Saini J had addressed the question directly. He held that the cross-undertaking in damages offered no protection, that Apollo was a British Virgin Islands special purpose vehicle which had failed to evidence its assets, and that he had no evidential basis for concluding that Apollo was in a position to meet any claim under the cross-undertaking.[xviii] That finding is now the most important fact about the inquiry Cooper KC has ordered. Nexedge has permission to enforce, and directions for an inquiry into four heads of loss, on a covenant a High Court judge has already held to be worth nothing.
The weight sits in parenthesis. Apollo, Saini J records, has unusually failed to serve in evidence any information as to its assets other than a month-old screenshot of its bank account balance. The adverb concedes the practice, since a departure can only be unusual when measured against a norm. Nothing in the record of the without notice hearing suggests that anyone asked. Cheema-Grubb J dealt with the duty of candour and granted the order on the basis of the undertakings provided.[xix] No fortification was sought, none was ordered and no evidence of means was required.
What the practice already requires
The doctrine is not the difficulty. The adequacy of the cross-undertaking forms part of the third limb of the test under section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, alongside the balance of prejudice between the parties and the intrusiveness of the relief, and that limb attracts anxious scrutiny.[xx]
Nor is the evidential expectation in doubt. The general practice is for a party seeking an interim injunction to adduce evidence of its ability to honour the cross-undertaking in damages, and where the applicant cannot show sufficient assets within the jurisdiction to give the undertaking substance it may be required to provide security.[xxi]
The obvious answer to all of this is that the without notice order is provisional, that it runs only to a return date and that the respondent can then ask for fortification. Foxton J has shown why that answer is weaker than it looks. Faced with an applicant which had no assets in the jurisdiction and could not fortify, he held that the applicant could have had no legitimate complaint if it had been required to give disclosure of its own assets when it sought the injunction, and that such a condition would have been appropriate even though at that stage the court could reach no reliable view as to whether the respondent would suffer loss or as to its extent.[xxii]
That reasoning removes the objection that the enquiry can only run one way. Fortification ordinarily requires the respondent first to satisfy the requirements set by the Court of Appeal, of which the hardest calls for an intelligent estimate of the likely loss, so that covenant strength is reached last and only by a respondent that can already quantify what the order is costing it. Foxton J’s point is that a condition directed at the applicant’s own position need not wait for any of that. He was troubled by the asymmetry of an applicant obtaining an injunction, and a contingent liability under the undertaking, without adducing any evidence as to its assets, while simultaneously obtaining a coercive order for disclosure of the respondent’s. He suggested the question might merit further consideration as the fiftieth anniversary of the Mareva injunction approached.[xxiii]
Four orders, four answers
The requirement exists, the authority for imposing it exists and the moment at which it can be imposed is a matter for the court. Set four Commercial Court freezing orders beside one another and the difficulty becomes apparent.
| Case | Order | Security at grant | After argument |
| Spence (2021) | Worldwide freezing order | £500,000, by insurance policy | £800,000 added, total £1.3m |
| Mints (2021) | Worldwide freezing order up to US$572m | US$250,000 | US$2m at the return date; further US$20m refused |
| Alta Trading (2015 to 2025) | Worldwide freezing order up to US$335m | US$2m | Further fortification refused in 2021; US$24.5m and US$50m later held by consent |
| Apollo (2025) | Freezing order against an FCA-regulated broker | None | Covenant held to offer no protection |
In Spence Calver J required £500,000 of fortification at the without notice hearing, provided by an insurance policy, and Moulder J later added £800,000 on a variation application, directing that it be provided in the same form.[xxiv]
In Mints the initial fortification on a worldwide order of up to US$572m was US$250,000. At the return date Jacobs J raised it to US$2m. Calver J, refusing a later application for a further US$20m, records how that increase came about. It was ordered in a short exchange between counsel and the judge at the end of the hearing, on argument he describes as cursory and conducted on a generalised basis with barely any reference to authority, in the course of which the judge asked how much the relevant loans were and was told that the figure was not known.[xxv]
Alta Trading is the sequence that should trouble a funder most. Teare J granted a worldwide order covering assets up to US$335m in February 2015, fortified at US$2m. In April 2021 Mr Peter MacDonald Eggers QC accepted that the fifth defendant’s losses might run at US$1m a year and that further fortification of US$6m to US$7m would follow, then refused the application on the single ground that there was an insufficient risk of the claimants failing to satisfy an award, relying on accounts showing US$48.8m of cash and US$53.2m of net assets. By February 2025 the account in question held US$24,566,474, which is US$66,000 above the minimum the claimants had undertaken to maintain.[xxvi]
In Apollo nothing was required at all, and the covenant was later held to be worth nothing.
The window closes on discharge
Once the injunction goes, the question can no longer be asked. Henshaw J has held that it would be wrong in principle, and inappropriate on the facts, to order increased fortification after discharge, including in substance by an order under CPR 3.1(5). The reasoning is that the court cannot require a claimant to give an undertaking at all. Fortification is an adjunct to the undertaking, and is required only in the sense of being the price the claimant pays if it wants the order to operate in the future. To attach it after discharge would impose an undertaking the claimant never gave.[xxvii]
That produces an uncomfortable result on these facts. Nexedge went to the return date seeking discharge rather than fortification, which was the right choice and it succeeded. Having succeeded, it can no longer compel the applicant to secure the covenant it is about to enforce. The respondent that wins outright at the return date is left with the bare promise of whoever gave it.
There is a related trap for anyone who does obtain security. In Alta Trading both consent orders, of US$24.5m and US$50m, combined fortification of the cross-undertaking with security for costs in a single undivided sum. Henshaw J twice declined to treat any part of either as available to meet costs, precisely because nobody had allocated it. A respondent that accepts a blended figure has secured two exposures out of one pot and cannot say how much of it stands behind either.[xxviii]
Funders on the applicant side
For a funder backing a claimant who will seek interim relief, the exposure is not the same shape as adverse costs, and the difference is worth stating precisely. Section 51 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 confers a discretion over the costs of and incidental to proceedings, and that jurisdiction reaches funders directly. It has been exercised against a funder on the indemnity basis where the funded claim was pursued abusively, and without the Arkin cap where the funder stood to take the larger share of any recovery. Damages under a cross-undertaking are not costs. They are compensation for loss caused by an order, owed under an undertaking given to the court by the applicant in the terms the order records. Section 51 does not extend to them.
The reason is structural. The court has no power to compel an applicant to give a cross-undertaking. It can only refuse the injunction if the applicant declines to offer one. The undertaking is given to the court rather than to the respondent, non-performance is a contempt rather than a breach of contract, and the undertaking is the price the applicant chooses to pay for the order. Liability under it therefore rests on a promise, and a person who has made no promise to the court has given it nothing to enforce. Section 51 reaches funders because Parliament conferred a discretion over costs which extends to non-parties. No equivalent jurisdiction exists here. The same principle is why fortification cannot be imposed once the injunction has gone.[xxix]
The routes that do exist are narrower than the costs jurisdiction, and each of them works by the funder assuming an obligation in its own name or by a separate cause of action. A funder can be required, as the practical condition of the relief its funded party is seeking, to put up fortification by payment into court, bank guarantee or policy. A funder that gives an undertaking to the court in its own name is bound by its terms. A funder that takes an active part in an abusive application exposes itself to the ordinary torts, which is a materially harder claim to bring and one that Nexedge is attempting against individuals as well as against Apollo.
The consequence for a funding agreement is straightforward. Where a funded claim contemplates a freezing order, the agreement should state who bears the cross-undertaking, whether the funder’s commitment extends to fortification, what happens if fortification is ordered mid-case at a level that exhausts the facility and who controls the decision to seek interim relief at all. A funder that has left those questions unanswered has either written an uncapped option against itself or has left its funded party unable to obtain the order on which the case depends.
The insurance market has already moved and the court has already accepted the product. The fortification in place before Moulder J in Spence was an insurance policy, and she directed that the additional £800,000 be provided in the same form. That concedes the argument made here. The promise standing behind a freezing order is worth the balance sheet or the policy behind it, and nothing more.[xxx]
Underwriting the other side
I have funded two cross-undertaking inquiries. They deserve treatment as an origination category in their own right.
The diligence profile is unusual and favourable, with one qualification that governs pricing. Wrongfulness is established before the claim reaches a funder, because the inquiry follows a discharge. The presumption of enforcement and the placing of the burden on the applicant remove much of the discretionary risk at the permission stage. Quantum is the live issue, and there is a recognisable framework for it. The party claiming on the inquiry also remains the defendant in the proceedings, so it can seek security for costs from the applicant rather than being exposed to an application in the other direction.[xxxi]
The qualification is that discharge arrives by two routes, and the difference between them governs price. Where the order falls at an interlocutory stage for material non-disclosure, as it did here, wrongfulness is established within months, the file is short and the inquiry can be case managed with the substantive proceedings.
Where the order falls only because the claim is dismissed at trial, every element of that changes. In Alta Trading the freezing order was granted in February 2015. The claims were dismissed at trial in January 2025 and the inquiry was ordered the following month, to be heard at a further two-week trial not before March 2026. A funder approached at that point is not backing a fresh claim on a clean timetable. It is backing the last stage of an action that has already run for eleven years, and the inquiry is itself a trial with pleadings, disclosure, evidence and appeal risk still ahead of it.
Three consequences follow. The counterparty deteriorates across the life of the action, so that a covenant judicially accepted as sound in April 2021 on accounts showing US$48.8m of cash had by February 2025 become an account holding US$66,000 more than the claimants had undertaken to maintain. The party bringing the inquiry may arrive exhausted, Henshaw J having recorded that solicitors extended credit to two of the defendants over a large part of the litigation. And the record is fixed, so that the funder inherits a decade of costs history, disclosure and findings it had no part in shaping. Fiona Trust has the same shape.[xxxii]
The interlocutory route is a fundable asset on a recognisable timetable. The trial route is a different proposition and should be priced as one.
The determining question in every case is recovery. A cross-undertaking given by a substantial trading company or a listed group is an asset capable of being valued. One given by an unfortified offshore vehicle is a claim against whatever can be traced to the person behind it, in a jurisdiction that may or may not assist. Any funder examining this category should treat the applicant’s covenant strength as the first diligence question rather than the last, and should not assume that the court has already asked it. In Apollo the answer is on the face of a judgment before the inquiry has begun.
The case management conference in Apollo XI v Nexedge is listed for 9 September 2026.
I edit Legal Finance Expert (LFE), an independent legal journal run by experts at the forefront of the legal finance and third-party litigation funding industry.
Notes
[i] Apollo XI Limited v Nexedge Markets Limited [2026] EWHC 2240 (Comm), Case No. CL-2025-000188, Mr Nigel Cooper KC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge. Heard 1 July 2026, judgment handed down 28 August 2026.
[ii] Apollo XI at [6] to [7]; Apollo XI Ltd v Nexedge Markets Ltd [2025] EWHC 1488 (KB) at [2] and [19].
[iii] Apollo XI at [9]. Saini J sets out the business plan more fully at [24] of the discharge judgment, including projected revenue rising from about £1.1m to £7.2m over the same period.
[iv] The judgment of Cheema-Grubb J of 16 April 2025 was given extempore in the Interim Applications Court and carries no neutral citation. It is set out in full at [57] of [2025] EWHC 1488 (KB). The return date was provided for by paragraph 4 of the order and was extended by a number of consent orders before being heard on 9 June 2025.
[v] Apollo XI Ltd v Nexedge Markets Ltd [2025] EWHC 1488 (KB), Saini J, 17 June 2025, at [63] to [119] and [120]. Indemnity costs were awarded against Apollo.
[vi] Apollo XI at [15], [20], [21] and [57].
[vii] Apollo XI at [5] and [66] to [67]. The inquiry is to be case managed and heard together with the substantive claims and counterclaims.
[ix] Balkanbank v Taher [1995] 2 All ER 904 (CA) at 909 per Staughton LJ, applied in Apollo XI at [24].
[x] Lunn Poly Ltd v Liverpool & Lancashire Properties Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 430 at [42], quoted in Apollo XI at [27]. The neutral citation is given in the Apollo judgment as [2006] EWCA Civ 30, which omits a digit and leads to an unrelated appeal.
[xi] Apollo XI at [29] to [33] and [37], citing Yukong Line Ltd v Rendsburg Investment Corp [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 113 (CA) at [35], Mex Group Worldwide Ltd v Ford [2026] EWHC 629 (KB) at [44] and Gee on Commercial Injunctions, 7th ed, at 11.041 and 11.043.
[xii] Apollo XI at [25], citing SCF Tankers Ltd v Privalov [2017] EWCA Civ 1877, [2018] 1 WLR 5623 at [55] and [57], Hone v Abbey Forwarding Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 711, [2015] Ch 309 at [150], and Al-Rawas v Pegasus Energy Ltd [2008] EWHC 617 (QB), [2009] 1 All ER 346 at [22] to [23].
[xiii] [2025] EWHC 1488 (KB), section VII. He also noted that the order was more intrusive than usual, containing no carve out for ordinary business expenses and requiring Nexedge to seek Apollo’s consent in advance for every line item of expenditure.
[xiv] SCF Tankers Ltd v Privalov [2017] EWCA Civ 1877, [2018] 1 WLR 5623; Alta Trading UK Ltd v Bosworth [2025] EWHC 2724 (Comm) at [9]. The fifth defendant in the same inquiry puts his own loss in excess of US$100m, plus interest of between US$8m and US$15.6m: Alta Trading UK Ltd v Bosworth [2025] EWHC 1097 (Comm), section (C)(4).
[xv] Apollo XI at [41], citing SCF Tankers at [48] and Alta Trading UK Ltd v Bosworth [2021] EWHC 1126 (Comm), [2021] 4 WLR 72 at [42(5)] per Mr Peter MacDonald Eggers QC.
[xvi] Alta Trading UK Ltd v Bosworth [2025] EWHC 2724 (Comm) at [54] and [55], set out in Apollo XI at [42]. Henshaw J records at [63] that this is a developing area of law and that permission to appeal to the Supreme Court has been granted in King Crude Carriers.
[xvii] Apollo XI at [44], [53], [54], [60] and [61]. Apollo denies sending the email. Its solicitors at the time accepted in an email of 4 June 2025 that it had.
[xviii] [2025] EWHC 1488 (KB) at [119].
[xix] [2025] EWHC 1488 (KB) at [57], reproducing the judgment of 16 April 2025 at [4] and [5].
[xx] [2025] EWHC 1488 (KB) at [59](3), citing Fundo Soberano de Angola v dos Santos and Gee on Commercial Injunctions, 7th ed, at 12-051.
[xxi] LAX SA v JBC SA [2024] EWHC 2042 (Comm), Foxton J, at [4(i)] and [4(ii)], citing Smo v Hywel Dda University Health Board [2019] EWHC 1973 (QB) at [76] and paragraph F14.3 of the Commercial Court Guide, 11th ed.
[xxii] LAX SA v JBC SA at [12]. He made the order in a different form, requiring worldwide asset disclosure above US$10,000, capped once US$1m of unencumbered equity had been disclosed, with the injunction to lapse if the schedule was not served by 6 September 2024: at [16].
[xxiii] LAX SA v JBC SA at [8] and [9]. The requirements for fortification are those endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Energy Venture Partners Ltd v Malabu Oil and Gas Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 1295, [2015] 1 WLR 2309 at [52] to [54], adopting the summary of Briggs J in Jirehouse and later restated by Popplewell J in Phoenix Group Foundation v Cochrane [2018] EWHC 2179 (Comm) at [14].
[xxiv] The Claimants set out in Schedule 1 to the Claim Form v Spence [2021] EWHC 925 (Comm), Moulder J, 16 April 2021. Moulder J observed that it was difficult to conceive what real evidence objectively establishing the risk could have been advanced beyond the clear terms of the banking facility itself.
[xxv] PJSC National Bank Trust v Mints [2021] EWHC 1089 (Comm), Calver J, 30 April 2021, under the heading Background. Counsel for the claimants objected that the judge was not following the guidance in Malabu Oil. The further US$20m was refused on remoteness and causation, the losses claimed being those of third party entities not themselves restrained by the order, whose difficulties could not be disentangled from the underlying fraud allegations and the Russian criminal proceedings.
[xxvi] Alta Trading UK Ltd v Bosworth [2021] EWHC 1126 (Comm) at [28] and [50]; Alta Trading UK Ltd v Bosworth [2025] EWHC 1097 (Comm), section (B). Farahead’s Jersey account fell over the same period from about US$111m to US$1,153,020 and its Nordea account from about US$54m to US$99,059.
[xxvii] Alta Trading UK Ltd v Bosworth [2025] EWHC 1097 (Comm) at [4(i)] and section (C)(2) and (C)(4), applying Commodity Ocean Transport Corp v Basford Unicorn Industries (The Mito) [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 197, Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co Ltd v Laos [2013] EWHC 2466 (Comm) at [45] and Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd v Dr Reddy’s Laboratories (UK) Ltd [2019] EWHC 1009 (Pat) at [10], the last holding that there is no jurisdiction. See also Gee on Commercial Injunctions, 7th ed, at 11-030.
[xxviii] Alta Trading UK Ltd v Bosworth [2025] EWHC 1097 (Comm), sections (B) and (D).
[xxix] F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1975] AC 295 at 361 per Lord Diplock; Tucker v New Brunswick Trading Co of London (1890) 44 Ch D 249 at 252 per Cotton LJ and per Lindley LJ, an undertaking being the price of an injunction; Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co Ltd v Laos [2013] EWHC 2466 (Comm) at [45] per Popplewell J. All three are collected in Alta Trading UK Ltd v Bosworth [2025] EWHC 1097 (Comm).
[xxx] Spence at [2] and the conclusion on form and timing, the additional fortification to be provided within two weeks.
[xxxi] JSC Karat-1 v Tugushev [2021] EWHC 743 (Comm), [2021] 4 WLR 66 at [38], following C T Bowring & Co (Insurance) Ltd v Corsi & Partners Ltd [1994] BCC 713 at 728 per Millett LJ, both discussed in Alta Trading [2025] EWHC 1097 (Comm), section (D)(1).
[xxxii] Alta Trading UK Ltd v Bosworth [2025] EWHC 1097 (Comm), section (B), and Alta Trading UK Ltd v Bosworth [2025] EWHC 2724 (Comm) at [2], [3] and [8]. The freezing order was granted by Teare J on 12 February 2015 and discharged in February 2025. On the credit extended to the first and second defendants see [2025] EWHC 1097 (Comm), section (D)(2). In the Fiona Trust litigation the freezing order dated from 2005 and the assessment under the cross-undertaking was not concluded in the Court of Appeal until 2017.
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