By Samuel Arksey

Third-party litigation funding (‘TPLF’) is now a multibillion-dollar asset class with a material presence in mass torts, class actions, and complex commercial arbitration across the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Continental Europe. Once largely confined to insolvency practitioners, it has expanded to provide capital for claims that would not otherwise be brought. That expansion has brought into sharper focus a structural feature of the funding model that is rarely examined when a case commences: the funder’s right to exit. When a funder terminates an agreement – whether because the case’s merits have deteriorated, the economics no longer justify continued deployment, or the funder itself faces financial pressure – the downstream consequences can include the collapse of otherwise viable claims, financial strain on law firms, and regulatory responses that reshape the market.

This article analyses when and why funders exit, how different jurisdictions have responded, and what the regulatory debate reveals about the conditions under which third-party capital can be integrated into civil justice.

The Theoretical and Historical Context of Funder Termination

To understand funder termination in its modern form, it is necessary to trace the historical prohibitions that governed the relationship between finance and litigation. The doctrines of maintenance and champerty were developed to prevent third parties from funding litigation for personal gain. Maintenance refers to the improper support of litigation by a third party without lawful justification; champerty is a specific form in which that third party shares in the proceeds. Both doctrines were designed to preserve judicial integrity by ensuring that disputes turned on their legal merits rather than the resources of an external speculator.

In England and Wales, the prohibition was dismantled in stages. The Criminal Law Act 1967 abolished maintenance and champerty as crimes and civil torts. The Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 subsequently authorised conditional fee arrangements. The specific regulatory framework for TPLF developed through Civil Justice Council reports, culminating in the Association of Litigation Funders (‘ALF’) Code of Conduct, first published in 2011. In Australia, the pivotal shift came with the High Court’s 2006 decision in Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd, which confirmed that litigation funding was not contrary to public policy and that funders could exercise broad influence over the conduct of proceedings. In the United States, while some states including New York maintain champerty restrictions, the prevailing trend has been toward acceptance of non-recourse litigation loans.

Despite this legal acceptance, the contractual right to terminate a funding agreement remains a core structural feature of the TPLF model, and a source of systemic risk when exercised in ways that leave claimants without recourse. Litigation funding agreements (‘LFAs’) are typically drafted to grant funders specific exit rights, triggered by “material changes” in the case’s outlook including, inter alia, adverse discovery, the loss of a key expert witness, or a shift in the defendant’s financial position. These provisions exist because funders bear non-recourse risk; without the ability to exit a case that has materially changed, no rational investor could price the product.

Comparative Evolution of Maintenance and Champerty Prohibitions

Jurisdiction	Status of Maintenance/Champerty	Primary Legal Catalyst for Change	Current Stance on Funder Exit
United Kingdom	Substantially modified; largely abolished for commercial funding.	Criminal Law Act 1967; Courts and Legal Services Act 1990; CJC Reports.	Governed by ALF Code of Conduct; termination permitted on “reasonable” grounds.
Australia	Abolished in many states; modified in others (e.g. Queensland).	Campbells Cash & Carry v Fostif (2006).	High judicial oversight of class action settlements.
United States	Varies by state; many follow “non-recourse” loan models.	State-level case law; absence of federal regulation.	Governed by contract law; contested on “control” grounds.
European Union	Historically restrictive; expanding in Netherlands and Germany.	Proposed Directive on TPLF (2022).	Moving toward restrictions on unilateral termination.

The Mechanics of Withdrawal: Contractual Triggers and Ethical Constraints

The decision to terminate a litigation investment is typically a response to the deterioration of the original investment case, not an arbitrary one. Funders employ experienced litigators and analysts to monitor cases in real time. When those monitors identify a “material breach” or conclude that the case no longer meets the funder’s return threshold, the termination provisions of the LFA may be invoked.

In England and Wales, the ALF Code of Conduct sets the standards for permissible termination. Clause 9 permits exit only where the funder “reasonably ceases to be satisfied about the merits,” “reasonably believes the dispute is no longer commercially viable,” or where there has been a “material breach” by the litigant. The code explicitly prohibits discretionary termination absent these specified grounds.

“Commercial viability” is, unavoidably, a judgment call. If projected costs increase to a point where the funder’s share of any recovery no longer covers its cost of capital plus risk premium, a rational funder will seek to exit. This creates a structural tension: the lawyer’s duty runs to the client, while the funder’s duty runs to its own investors. If a funder withdraws, the lawyer may hold continuing ethical obligations to a client who can no longer meet the costs of proceedings, and who may require court approval before that lawyer can also withdraw.

Specific Termination Grounds under the ALF Code of Conduct

Clause	Termination Trigger	Threshold Requirement	Dispute Mechanism
9(b)(i)	Merits of the dispute.	Reasonableness of the funder’s reassessment.	Binding opinion from a King’s Counsel (KC).
9(b)(ii)	Commercial viability.	Reasonableness of belief regarding financial return.	Binding opinion from a King’s Counsel (KC).
9(b)(iii)	Material breach by litigant.	Proof of breach of LFA terms.	Standard contractual dispute resolution.
10	Discretionary withdrawal.	Explicitly prohibited under the Code.	N/A (Non-compliant LFAs are invalidated).

The English Courts and Contractual Exit Rights: Harcus Sinclair v Buttonwood Legal Capital

The contractual framework governing termination received its most direct early analysis from the High Court in Harcus Sinclair (a firm) v Buttonwood Legal Capital Limited and others [2013] EWHC 1193 (Ch), decided by David Donaldson QC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge. The case remains one of the few English authorities directly on the mechanics of LFA termination and the rights of the parties on exit.

Buttonwood Legal Capital Ltd (BLC) had extended funding to AREF, an investment fund pursuing claims in the Commercial Court. The arrangement was structured as a loan repayable on the earlier of the conclusion of proceedings or two years, with immediate repayment triggered on an Event of Default. That default included AREF’s prospects of success falling to 60% or below in BLC’s “reasonable opinion.” AREF’s solicitors were required under the agreement to provide written advice confirming prospects above that threshold. In 2011, a “preliminary view” was supplied – described by the solicitors as enabling potential backers to decide whether to provide funds – but no more formal advice ever followed, despite repeated requests from BLC.

BLC subsequently terminated its relationship with its investment manager and conducted a general review of its funded portfolio. It retained independent counsel on the AREF case; that counsel’s preliminary assessment was that the prospects of establishing a repudiatory breach – a critical element of AREF’s claim – were less than 50% on the available evidence. BLC terminated the agreement without giving AREF the opportunity to make representations on the merits. AREF challenged the termination on the ground that it had not been reached “reasonably,” principally because BLC had not considered certain potential witness evidence and had not allowed AREF to comment on the independent opinion before acting on it.

The court rejected those arguments. The judge held that the “reasonableness” requirement in the termination clause was a purely substantive question: it covered the opinion itself, assessed against the available evidence and applicable legal principles, not the process by which the funder arrived at it. If the resulting opinion fell within the range of reasonable conclusions, the termination was valid regardless of the procedure adopted. AREF’s failure to provide the documentation and cooperation that BLC had requested was noted critically by the court. The judge also ordered that all funds held in the solicitors’ escrow account be returned to BLC, on the basis that termination extinguished AREF’s right to further draws, and the court could only give effect to the parties’ obligations as they stood at the time of the order.

BLC was not a member of the ALF and was therefore not subject to the Code of Conduct introduced in November 2011. This is a significant distinction. The ALF Code’s procedural protections, in particular the requirement for a binding KC opinion where termination is disputed, did not apply. Had they done so, AREF would at minimum have been entitled to invoke the independent KC mechanism before the termination took effect. The Buttonwood judgment illustrates precisely what is at stake for a funded party that agrees to an LFA outside the Code’s framework: a substantively reasonable opinion, even one reached without notice, will be sufficient to terminate the arrangement and recover committed funds.

ALF Code vs. Non-Member Framework: The Buttonwood Contrast

Feature	ALF Code Framework	Buttonwood (Non-Member) Framework
Membership/Applicability	Mandatory for ALF members.	Not applicable; BLC not an ALF member.
Termination Standard	Reasonableness of merits or viability assessment.	Reasonable opinion that prospects ≤60% – purely substantive, process irrelevant.
Procedural Safeguard	Binding KC opinion required if termination disputed.	No equivalent: funder obtained its own independent counsel’s view.
Funded Party’s Rights	Right to challenge termination via KC opinion mechanism.	No right to make representations on the merits before termination.
Escrow/Cost Funds	Code silent on escrow recovery mechanics.	Court ordered return of all escrow funds to BLC on termination.

Three points of lasting significance emerge from the judgment. First, courts will hold funded parties to the contractual terms they have agreed, including termination thresholds that sit below the merits standards a reasonable funder might be expected to apply. Second, the cooperation obligations on the funded party are real: a claimant who obstructs the funder’s ongoing assessment of the case cannot later complain that the assessment was conducted on incomplete information, if that incompleteness resulted from the claimant’s own conduct. Third, and most practically, termination dispossesses the funded party not only of future funding but of committed funds already held in escrow. The financial exposure on termination is therefore wider than the face value of the LFA alone.

Case Study: The James Hardie Litigation and the Limits of Mid-Trial Funding

The consequences of mid-trial funding withdrawal are illustrated by the James Hardie “leaky buildings” litigation in New Zealand, a case involving Harbour Litigation Funding that has been widely cited in Australian and UK commentary as a reference point for the structural risks inherent in TPLF.

In August 2021, mid-trial, Harbour withdrew its support for over 1,000 homeowners seeking approximately $220 million in damages for defective cladding. Harbour had invested substantial sums in the proceedings and concluded during trial that the case no longer met the threshold for continued investment. As a non-recourse funder bearing 100% of the downside risk, its decision reflected an assessment of that risk and its obligations to its own investors. Harbour also faced the prospect of liability for an adverse costs order had the case continued and failed.

The outcome for the claimants was severe. Without funding, the homeowners (many elderly and already significantly out of pocket) could not sustain the proceedings. The resulting settlement delivered no compensation, required $1.25 million held by the court to be paid to James Hardie for its costs, and extinguished all future liability for the affected group.

The James Hardie case is cited not as evidence of bad faith on Harbour’s part, but as a structural argument for clearer contractual and regulatory limits on mid-trial withdrawal. Leading practitioners argued that a code equivalent to Australia’s would have prevented exit once trial had commenced. The case does not establish that TPLF is harmful – without funding the claimants would not have reached trial at all – but it demonstrates that the point at which a funder exits can determine whether access to justice is substantive or nominal. Read alongside Buttonwood, it also illustrates the spectrum: where Buttonwood confirmed the court will uphold contractual termination rights rigorously, James Hardie shows the human cost when those rights are exercised at the outer limit of what is contractually permitted.

Comparative Outcomes of the James Hardie/Harbour Withdrawal

Metric	Pre-Withdrawal Expectation	Post-Withdrawal Reality
Claimant Recovery	Estimated $220 million total damages.	$0.00.
Legal Costs	Funded by Harbour; adverse costs indemnified.	Claimants responsible for $1.25 million payout to defendant.
Legal Precedent	Expected ruling on “Harditex” product defects.	No admission of liability; claims extinguished.
Funder Liability	Investment of millions in legal fees and disbursements.	Loss of invested capital plus $1.25 million settlement contribution.

The United States: Control and the Sysco–Burford Dispute

In the United States, funder withdrawal disputes have often resolved into questions about control rather than exit. Unlike England, where the ALF Code restricts funders from directing litigation strategy, US funding agreements may include more expansive rights over settlement decisions. A dispute between Burford Capital and Sysco Corporation illustrates the tensions that arise when those rights are exercised.

Burford had invested approximately $140 million to fund a series of antitrust claims by Sysco against beef and pork suppliers. When Sysco sought to settle certain claims for amounts Burford considered insufficient to satisfy its return requirements under the LFA, Burford exercised its contractual rights – specifically, the consent-to-settlement clause – to resist those settlements. From Burford’s perspective, it had bargained for and received the right to approve or refuse settlements, and was entitled to enforce that right against a counterparty seeking to exit on terms that would have left Burford significantly out of pocket.

Sysco characterised Burford’s position as holding the litigation hostage to the funder’s return requirements. Burford sought an injunction in arbitration to prevent settlement, and an arbitral tribunal initially granted a temporary restraining order on the basis that Sysco’s proposed settlements would breach the anti-assignment and consent provisions of the LFA. Sysco ultimately resolved the situation by assigning the claims to a Burford affiliate, Carina Ventures LLC.

A federal magistrate judge in Minnesota observed that permitting a funder to override the decisions of the actual party to the suit would “undermine agreements between parties otherwise willing to settle.” The Sysco–Burford case did not resolve the question of whether consent-to-settlement clauses are enforceable as a matter of US law, but it demonstrated the practical consequences of inadequate drafting around the allocation of settlement authority, and the degree to which a funder’s portfolio-level incentives may diverge from its claimant’s case-specific interests.

The United Kingdom and the PACCAR Unenforceability Crisis

The English market encountered a significant legal challenge in July 2023 when the Supreme Court ruled in R (on the application of PACCAR Inc & Ors) v Competition Appeal Tribunal & Ors. The Court held that LFAs providing for a return calculated as a percentage of damages were “damages-based agreements” (‘DBAs’). Under the Damages-Based Agreements Regulations 2013, such agreements must satisfy strict formal requirements to be enforceable – requirements that most existing LFAs did not meet.

The immediate consequence was that a significant proportion of outstanding funding agreements became potentially unenforceable. Claimants could, in theory, retain the fruits of funded litigation without paying the funder’s contractual share. Funders renegotiated agreements and moved toward structures based on “multiples of invested capital” rather than percentage recovery.

Post-PACCAR Market Disruption and Response

Impact Category	Effect of PACCAR Ruling	Mitigation Strategy
Contract Validity	Majority of existing LFAs rendered unenforceable.	Renegotiation using “multiples of funding” instead of percentages.
Investor Confidence	Decline in investor confidence and market liquidity.	Proposed “Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) Bill.”
Collective Actions	Opt-out proceedings in the CAT particularly exposed.	CJC recommends retrospective legislative reversal.
Judicial Interpretation	Courts asked to “sever” percentage clauses.	Therium v Bugsby explored severability.

The government indicated its intention to introduce legislation, including with retrospective effect, to restore the enforceability of percentage-based litigation funding agreements (LFAs). This was seen as necessary to safeguard large-scale consumer claims – such as the trucks cartel litigation, where third-party funding often constitutes the only viable means of securing redress for thousands of small businesses. However, the Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) Bill, introduced in March 2024, failed to progress during the pre-election “wash-up” period ahead of the 2024 general election. Following the election, the incoming Labour government chose not to revive the Bill immediately, instead opting to await the outcome of the Civil Justice Council’s comprehensive review of litigation funding.

Australia: Judicial Scrutiny and the Rejection of the “MIS” Regime

Australia’s treatment of funder withdrawal has been shaped by an ongoing tension between legislative control and judicial oversight. Between 2020 and 2022, the government attempted to regulate litigation funding as a “Managed Investment Scheme” (‘MIS’), requiring funders to hold an Australian Financial Services Licence (‘AFSL’). The intent was to impose capital adequacy requirements that would reduce the risk of insolvency-driven exits.

The MIS regime attracted criticism as ill-suited to class action structures, and in 2022 the Full Court of the Federal Court unanimously held that litigation funding schemes did not constitute MISs. Despite deregulation, Australian courts maintain a level of oversight that exceeds that in the US or UK. Under Section 33V of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, class action settlements cannot be discontinued or settled without court approval.

In Earglow Pty Ltd v Newcrest Mining Limited, the court exercised its power to reduce a funder’s commission, notwithstanding the contractual agreement of class members. This judicial gatekeeping means that if a funder seeks to exit or settle on terms disadvantageous to the group, the court can intervene to protect unrepresented members.

The European Union: Moving Toward Restrictions on Unilateral Termination

In Continental Europe, TPLF is a more recent development, growing most rapidly in the Netherlands and Germany. The European Parliament’s 2022 resolution on “Responsible Private Funding of Litigation” called for a directive establishing common minimum standards.

Among the more significant proposals in the draft directive is a ban on unilateral funder termination. This responds directly to James Hardie-type scenarios, where a funder’s exit mid-proceedings leave claimants without a viable path to continue. Critics argue that these restrictions, combined with proposed capital adequacy requirements and adverse cost liability, will reduce the risk-return ratio to a point where external capital is no longer attracted to the market at all.

Key Provisions of the Proposed EU Directive on TPLF

Provision	Mechanism	Objective
Unilateral Termination Ban	Third-party funding agreements cannot be terminated solely by the funder.	Protects claimants from mid-proceedings abandonment.
Capital Adequacy	Funders must meet specific criteria to demonstrate they can meet commitments.	Prevents insolvency-driven exits.
Fiduciary Duty	Funders assigned a legal duty to act in the claimant’s best interest.	Aligns investor and claimant incentives.
Adverse Cost Liability	Funders liable for defendant’s costs if the claimant lacks funds.	Discourages under-capitalised funding of weak claims.[12]

Funder Insolvency and the Economics of Contagion: The Katch Case

Funder withdrawal is not always a voluntary decision. The 2025 liquidation of the Katch Litigation Fund in Luxembourg illustrates how shifting market conditions can force an exit that no party desired.

Katch Investment Group had established a significant position in the UK consumer claims market, backing motor finance (PCP) claims worth hundreds of millions of pounds. Extended resolution timelines, combined with regulatory uncertainty from the Financial Conduct Authority, created a liquidity shortfall. Katch self-liquidated its litigation fund sub-fund, writing down its value from £422 million to £358 million within months.

The consequences reached beyond Katch’s own investors. SSB Law and McDermott Smith, both primarily funded by Katch, collapsed into administration in 2024, leaving thousands of claimants without representation. A £250 million action against Uber on behalf of London taxi drivers was placed in uncertainty as Katch sought to raise fresh capital under a restructured “Legal Lending Fund.”

The Katch case demonstrates that litigation funding portfolios carry inherent duration risk. If settlements do not materialise within projected timelines, liquidity pressures can force an exit from funded cases that remain, on their merits, viable. This is not a failure of intent; it is a structural consequence of mismatched asset and liability profiles, and it reinforces the case for capital adequacy requirements as a regulatory tool.

The Role of ATE Insurance and Security for Costs

When a funder withdraws, the defendant’s primary concern is recovering legal costs if the claimant eventually fails. After-the-Event (‘ATE’) insurance and Security for Costs orders are the principal mechanisms for managing this risk.

In the UK and Australia, courts may order a claimant to provide security for costs, typically through a funder deed of indemnity or bank guarantee. If a funder exits, the defendant may seek to stay proceedings until a replacement funder provides fresh security. In the Excalibur case, the funders were held liable for indemnity costs on the basis that the claims had “no sound foundation in fact or law.” The threat of a non-party costs order – which can be applied even post-withdrawal – acts as a meaningful deterrent against funding claims without adequate conviction in their merits. The Buttonwood judgment adds a further dimension: where funds are held in escrow, the funder’s right to recover them on termination is immediate and unconditional, regardless of any argument that ongoing obligations survived the termination event.

The Mechanics of Security for Costs in Funded Litigation

Mechanism	Purpose	Funder Responsibility
Security for Costs Order	Ensures defendant can recover costs if they prevail.	Funder often provides an undertaking or ATE policy.
Non-Party Costs Order	Holds the funder directly liable for costs.	Can be applied even where the funder withdrew before judgment.
ATE Anti-Avoidance	Prevents insurers from cancelling coverage.	Ensures cover remains in place even if the funder exits.

Access to Justice and the Limits of the Entrepreneurial Litigation Critique

The case for TPLF as an access-to-justice mechanism rests on a straightforward premise: many meritorious claims cannot be brought without external capital. In Australia, Justice Lee observed that without funding, group members in class actions would be reduced to “supplicants” rather than litigants. Funders provide capital on a non-recourse basis, bearing losses on claims that fail; the premium they charge on successful claims reflects that risk, not exploitation.

Critics, including the US Chamber of Commerce, argue that the profit motive generates volume litigation at the expense of quality, and that TPLF “tips the scales of justice for profit.” The structural response is direct: funders who back claims without merit bear the costs when those claims fail. Commercial self-interest does not, in practice, align with meritless litigation at scale.

What James Hardie and comparable cases raise is a different question: whether broad funder exit rights convert the access-to-justice argument into something conditional. A claimant who reaches trial on external funding and is then abandoned mid-trial may be worse off than if the case had never been brought – facing adverse cost orders, exhausted legal teams, and extinguished claims. The Buttonwood judgment, read in this context, is a reminder that the same contractual logic operates at every stage: courts will uphold termination rights without sentiment, and the funded party’s recourse depends entirely on the protections it negotiated at the outset. The regulatory debate is not, therefore, about whether TPLF is beneficial in principle. It is about whether the conditions attached to that benefit are adequately defined and protected.

Mathematical Modelling of Funder Risk and Exit Thresholds

A funder’s decision to maintain or exit an investment can be modelled using a net present value (NPV) calculation. Let P be the probability of success, D be the estimated damages, C be the future costs to reach judgment, and S be the funder’s contractual share.

The funder’s expected value (EV) is: EV = (P × D × S) − C

If a mid-trial expert report reduces D substantially, or discovery reveals that P is materially lower than initially assessed, EV may become negative. The sunk cost of prior investment is, from that point, irrelevant. The question is whether future expected returns exceed future costs. Where they do not, the funder faces a decision structurally identical to any other capital allocation. In the Buttonwood framework, the equivalent inflection point is where independent counsel assesses prospects at or below 60%: below that threshold, the LFA termination clause is engaged as a matter of contract, and the EV calculation becomes legally, as well as economically, determinative.

Two factors complicate this analysis. First, adverse cost exposure: a funder may remain liable for a portion of defendant costs even after withdrawal, depending on LFA terms and jurisdiction. Second, reputational cost: funders who exit repeatedly will find it harder to maintain quality law firm relationships and access co-funders, constraining deal flow over time.

Future Outlook: Disclosure, Harmonisation, and the Shift Toward Institutional Standards

The trend across jurisdictions is toward mandatory disclosure of funding arrangements. In the United States, a growing number of states and federal courts require disclosure of the funder’s identity and LFA terms at the outset of proceedings. This is designed to allow courts to manage conflicts of interest from the start and to prevent mid-case withdrawals that catch defendants and courts by surprise.

In international arbitration, the 2025 SIAC Rules and updates to the ICSID framework have introduced comparable disclosure obligations, with tribunals empowered to order a funder’s disqualification where a post-constitution conflict of interest is discovered.

The Three Pillars of Future TPLF Regulation

Pillar	Focus	Implementation
Transparency	Mandatory disclosure of funders and LFA terms.	Standardised in US courts, SIAC, and the EU proposed directive.
Stability	Capital adequacy and prudential supervision.	EU and historical Australian licensing models.
Responsibility	Restrictions on unilateral withdrawal and fee caps.	EU draft directive and UK ALF self-regulatory code.

Conclusion: The Institutionalisation of Litigation Finance

Funder withdrawal is a predictable feature of a non-recourse capital model. It follows the same logic that applies to any investment: where the expected return no longer justifies the expected cost, continued deployment is irrational. The question for policymakers is not whether funders should have exit rights, but under what conditions and at what point those rights may be exercised without undue harm to claimants who have no independent means of proceeding.

The cases examined in this article – Buttonwood, James Hardie, Sysco, and Katch – represent four distinct modalities of exit: judicial validation of contractual termination rights, mid-trial voluntary withdrawal, enforcement of settlement veto rights, and insolvency-driven collapse. In each instance, the funder acted consistently with its own economic interests or contractual entitlements; in each instance, the adequacy of protection for the funded party was determined before the case began, not at the point of exit.

The regulatory direction is consistent across jurisdictions, even where methods differ; greater transparency, more robust capital requirements, clearer constraints on when withdrawal is permissible, and stronger mechanisms for protecting claimants when it occurs. The Buttonwood judgment is a useful baseline – it confirms what courts will enforce in the absence of additional safeguards. The objective of regulatory reform, shared across the US, UK, Australia, and the EU, is to ensure that third-party capital can be integrated into civil justice without the terms of its withdrawal determining whether justice is available at all.

———

References

1. Litigation Funding 2025 – UK | Global Practice Guides – Chambers and Partners.
2. Litigation funding and access to justice – Victorian Law Reform Commission.
3. Litigation Funding Overview – United Kingdom. Deminor.
4. The Rise and Minor Fall of Litigation Funding in Australia | IADC.
5. Australia. Woodsford Litigation Funding (2023).
6. Third-Party Litigation Funding: Tipping the Scales of Justice for Profit. NAMIC.
7. The Litigation Finance Contract. William & Mary Law Review.
8. Justice for hire? Oxera.
9. The Association of Litigation Funders of England and Wales Code of Conduct.
10. New code of conduct for litigation funders. Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer.
11. Grim Realities. Institute for Legal Reform (2024).
12. News on Third-Party Funding in the EU. Uria.
13. Omni Bridgeway Limited. FIIG Securities.
14. Third-Party Litigation Funding. Cornell Law School Community.
15. When Litigation Financing Backfires: The AkinMears Bankruptcy Case.
16. High-profile litigator urges govt to fix class action law. The Law Association.
17. Class actions and litigation funding in New Zealand. Wilson Harle.
18. Claimant devastated James Hardie case ended mid-trial. RNZ News.
19. Class Actions Update. Hesketh Henry.
20. Litigation funding and PACCAR: reverse, regulate and reform. Charles Russell Speechlys (2025).
21. Hidden Money Pours into Litigation: Third Party Litigation Funding. Judicial Hellholes.
22. A glimpse into the secret world of litigation funding agreements. Daily Journal.
23. PACCAR reversal: Government confirms intention to introduce new legislation. Mishcon.
24. Litigation Funding: Civil Justice Council Recommends New Regulatory Regime. Cleary Gottlieb.
25. Panoramic Litigation Funding 2024. Woodsford.
26. Litigation funding agreement may be enforceable in part despite Paccar decision. Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer (2023).
27. Litigation Funding Waterfalls Are Compliant Post-PACCAR (UK). Crowell & Moring.
28. Litigation Funding: A New Era? K&L Gates (2024).
29. Litigation Funding 2023. Woodsford.
30. EU Regulatory Reforms in Litigation Funding. Augusta.
31. Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation. ALRC.
32. Litigation Funding 2023. Woodsford (Full Book).
33. Australian Federal Court Has Power to Reduce Litigation Funder’s Commission. Jones Day (2017).
34. Blairgowrie Trading Ltd v Allco Finance Group Ltd [2017]. ICP.
35. Responsible private funding of litigation. European Parliament.
36. Third-Party Litigation Funding (TPLF). European Commission.
37. Top litigation funder puts consumer claims fund into liquidation. Legal Futures.
38. UK Litigation Funder Stung by Car Finance Saga Is Raising Cash Again. Insurance Journal (2026).
39. Case Law. Litigation Finance Canada. Omni Bridgeway.
40. Damning Judgment from Commercial Court in US$1.6bn Energy Dispute. Brick Court.
41. Correcting the record – litigation funding and returns to group members in Australian funded class actions. Omni Bridgeway (2020).
42. Written Evidence from the US Chamber Institute for Legal Reform (CR 18). Parliament UK.
43. Australian litigation funder plans more mass claims against big UK firms. The Guardian (2015).
44. Evolution of SIAC Arbitration Rules Since 2010. SCC Online (2025).
45. Harcus Sinclair (a firm) v Buttonwood Legal Capital Ltd & Ors [2013] EWHC 1193 (Ch). Pinsent Masons / Out-Law commentary (September 2013).